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Using tax abatements, financial incentives, and public investments to attract (or retain) 
firms is the primary economic development tool for many local governments. Often local job 
creation policies focus on increasing capital through grants, low-interest financing, and other 
economic development incentives. Theory predicts that capital subsidies induce firm behaviors 
that limit their job creation effects. This paper employs the Incentives Environment Index, 
constructed from state constitutional provisions that limit and structure the ability of state and 
local governmental entities to aid private enterprises, and five-year county panels to test 
theoretical predictions on county capital expenditure and input mixes as well as industry 
establishment shares. The results indicate the act of increasing capital subsidy tools is associated 
with capital-labor substitution, decreased employment density, and changes in local industry 
mix. Results are robust to alternative empirical specifications and measures of capital subsidy 
availability. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Responsibility for policies supporting local economic growth and jobs increasingly lies 
with state and local policymakers. As political polarization and limited federal resources hamper 
federal responses to the sluggish labor market, demands for state and local officials “to do 
something about jobs” will likely increase (Bartik 2012). Often local job creation policies focus 
on increasing business retention and recruitment through grants, low-interest financing, and other 
nontax economic development incentives. These nontax incentives effectively subsidize capital 
rather than labor; yet they are touted as job creation policies.  
Despite being featured prominently in public debate on economic development 
incentives, there are few studies of nontax incentives (cash and near-cash grants, low-interest 
financing, free land and buildings, and so on). In part, this is due to lack of data on state and local 
nontax capital subsidies.  The few existing studies rely on spending measures, which lump 
capital subsidies with other types of economic development programming and miss a portion of 
nontax incentives, or program measures. Studies employing economic development spending 
tend to find positive effects, while studies using program measures generally find negative or 
insignificant effects. Both spending and program measures present challenges to identifying the 
causal effect of capital subsidy incentives. In a “stellar illustration of pertinent, path-breaking 
research on state incentives” (Woodward 2012, p. 11), Patrick (2014a) develops the Incentive 
Environment Index (IEI) to investigate the effects of nontax capital subsidies on jobs. Patrick 
finds that increasing the ability of governments to aid private enterprise has a negative medium-
term effect on rural county employment levels and no significant effect otherwise.  Her results 
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are consistent with program measure-based findings that incentives don’t support local job 
creation.   
The research herein investigates the potential mechanisms underlying these findings for 
incentives aimed at subsidizing capital. Theory outlined in this paper predicts that capital 
subsidies will have two effects. The first effect is capital-labor substitution, whereby firms that 
can substitute capital for labor adjust their input mix in favor of capital. The theory also predicts 
that subsidy-induced changes in total costs allow relatively capital-intensive firms to outbid 
relatively labor-intensive firms for land, causing changes in locations’ industry mix. Taken 
together, these two effects lead to no change or decreases in local employment levels—even if 
subsidies induce firm location on the margin. 
The present paper employs the IEI and five year county panels to test theoretical 
predictions on county manufacturing capital expenditure and input mixes as well as industry 
establishment shares. A rich set of control variables and first-differencing helps to isolate the 
effect of capital subsidy availability. Previous research also suggests rural and urban areas 
respond differently to job creation stimuli. The paper therefore analyzes rural and urban counties 
separately. A subset of urban counties located in multi-state MSAs is also examined. The results 
indicate increasing capital subsidy availability is associated with both capital-labor substitution 
and changes in local industry mix, limiting the job creation effects of these policies. Consistent 
with previous findings, urban and rural counties respond differently to an increase in the IEI, and 
pooling counties masks heterogeneity in the effects for rural and urban counties. This suggests 
that incentive effects may vary with the level of agglomeration. Capital subsidies appear most 
effective at inducing capital expenditure in urban areas.  Capital expenditure per employee 
increases with capital subsidies, and employment density declines. As predicted by theory, 
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relatively capital-intensive industries increase their establishment shares at the expense of 
relatively labor-intensive industries, with which they compete for land.  
The results are robust to an alternative border fixed-effects random trend specification. 
The sample is limited to counties that share a state border, and the first-differenced equation is 
estimated with a border-specific fixed effect. This method has the advantage of focusing on 
within-border-area variation induced by differences in capital subsidy availability. The results 
are also robust to alternative measures constructed from state constitutional provisions governing 
public aid to private enterprises. 
The paper proceeds in Section 2 by discussing key findings in the literature. Section 3 
sketches a simple theoretical model of equilibrium changes under a capital subsidy regime. The 
data and empirical strategy are described in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the estimation results, 
and Section 6 explores robustness. Some concluding remarks are provided in Section 7. 
2 BACKGROUND ON NONTAX CAPITAL SUBSIDIES AND JOB CREATION 
Despite decades of research on economic development incentives, there is relatively little 
research on the effects of nontax incentives. Yet these types of incentives (cash and near-cash 
grants, low-interest financing, free land and buildings, etc.) feature prominently in the public 
debate because this type of incentive most closely resembles the legalized bribery of companies 
and because it often makes up the bulk of incentives packages (Bartik 2012; Patrick 2014a). 
Consider, for example, the state and local incentives in Google’s recent selection of North 
Carolina. Morgan (2009) estimates the tax incentive portions of the package (credits, 
exemptions, and refunds) totaled $91.6 million, compared to the $170 million grant portion of 
the package. Although comprehensive data on state and local economic development incentives 
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are not available, some evidence suggests these incentives may account for as much as three-
quarters of state and local resources devoted to economic development (Bartik, Erickcek, and 
Eisinger 2003). One survey of state economic development programs reports that “the 
percentage of businesses receiving more than $50,000 through nontax programs significantly 
exceeded that percentage for tax programs” (Council for Community and Economic Research 
2013, p.19). Patrick (2014a) analyzes the incentive packages contained in the Good Jobs First 
megadeals subsidy database from 1985–2000 and finds that the reported value of the nontax 
portion was 1.7 times greater than the value of the tax incentives.1  
The few studies of nontax incentives yield mixed results, in part because of differences in 
measures of incentives and methodologies. This line of research generally relies upon state 
measures of economic development expenditures or programs. These measures pose challenges 
for identifying the causal effect of nontax incentives (that effectively subsidize capital) on jobs. 
For example, de Bartoleme and Spiegel (1997) and Goss and Phillips (1997) find a positive 
relationship between state economic development spending and job growth. However, it is 
difficult to interpret these results as the causal effect of nontax incentives on job creation, for a 
variety of reasons. Critically, state economic development spending does not capture local 
resources. These data are not generally available, but research suggests local spending is at least 
as much as state spending in some places, and much greater in others.2 State economic 
development spending is likely endogenous to state economic conditions. Furthermore, 
economic development spending confounds the effects of different types of incentive programs 
1 Details are available in the online appendix of Patrick (2014a). The total value of nontax incentives was 
$2,925,800,000, compared to $1,750,120,000 for tax incentives, based upon the author’s calculations. These values 
are exclusive of worker training incentives when possible. Another $95,000,000 was classified as “other.” Incentives 
classified as “other” were unspecified in the source data. Analysis is available upon request from the author. 
2 For example, Thomas (2011) reports the local/state subsidy ratio for Missouri—one of the few states for 
which he determined reliable data could be obtained—was 7:1. Thomas estimates total state and local spending by 
extrapolation and the assumption that most local subsidies equal state subsidies. 
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and nonincentive activities. It is reasonable to expect that economic development activities such 
as marketing, technical assistance, and workforce training will have different effects from cash, 
grants, loans, site development, and low-interest financing. Economic development spending 
bundles all these activities together, and even detailed budget data doesn’t readily allow for 
separation.3  
Rather than spending, other researchers employ program measures. Ó hUallacháin and 
Satterthwaite (1992) use tax rate measures, industrial revenue bond (IDB) financing, and 
program dummy variables. They find only the dummy variables for enterprise zones and 
university research parks have a positive statistical relationship with employment growth. 
Recognizing the limitations of their empirical approach, Ó hUallacháin and Satterthwaite are 
careful not to claim causation. Goetz et al. (2011) create measures of the share of all possible 
programs available in states and characterize programs in terms of “race to the top” (RTT) and 
“race to the bottom” (RTB) policies. They find tax incentive and financial assistance programs 
may harm growth rather than help. However, even their classification does not distinguish 
between the effects of capital subsidization and other policies. For example, RTT policies 
include capital subsidy programs targeted at innovative firms. RTB policies include capital 
subsidy programs aimed at traditional industries.  
Like spending, program variables may also be endogenous to economic conditions. In 
fact, the policy literature indicates economic development policy does react and evolve based 
3 For example, the Council for Community and Economic Research’s State Economic Development 
Expenditures Database contains totals for U.S. states’ economic development expenditures by functional category.  
These categories do not differentiate between different types of incentives and other economic development 
activities. For example, marketing activities are included in International Trade and Investment, Domestic 
Recruitment, Tourism and Film, and Program Support. Multiple categories also include expenditures for capital 
subsidies (e.g., cash, loans, grants, site development), which makes determining total expenditure on these programs 
unfeasible even at the state level. Capital subsidies for private enterprises are included in the following functional 
categories: Business Finance, Strategic Business Attraction Fund, Domestic Recruitment, Technology Transfer, 
Entrepreneurial Development, Minority Business Development, and Community Assistance. 
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upon economic conditions (Greenbaum, Russell, and Petras 2010). Empirical evidence is 
inconclusive with regard to the direction of bias, though. Both distressed and growing locations 
have been found to be more likely to use economic development incentives and create programs 
in response to local economic conditions.  
Incentive offers reflect local economic conditions, incentive packages offered by 
competing localities, and the “rules of the game” as dictated by federal and state constitutions. 
Patrick (2014a) overcomes some of the aforementioned challenges by creating the Incentives 
Environment Index (IEI) from state constitution provisions governing state and local government 
aid to private enterprise. These state constitution provisions originated in the mid-to-late 
nineteenth century in response to state and local government financial crises caused by 
participation in economic development projects (via railroads, canals, ferries, etc.). The types of 
programs available in locations across the United States are a direct reflection of the limits 
placed by these constitutional provisions. As detailed below, the IEI measures the ability of 
government to use public monies, credit, and property in the aid of private enterprise. It is not a 
measure of other types of economic development programming, such as human capital 
investments, amenities, tax breaks, or direct jobs programs. However, the availability of 
programs like industrial revenue bonds, venture capital funds, loan guarantee programs, etc., is 
directly governed by these constitutional provisions. 
Similar to Ó hUallacháin and Satterthwaite (1992) and Goetz et al. (2011), Patrick 
(2014a) finds little evidence that increasing the availability of these types of incentives supports 
local jobs. In particular, she finds that increasing the ability of governments to aid private 
enterprise has a significant negative medium-term effect on rural county employment levels, and 
no significant effect otherwise.  Patrick (2014a) postulates two potential reasons for the negative 
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and insignificant direct effects: either increasing the availability of incentives in an area does not 
result in a net capital increase, or the net new capital does not result in new jobs (perhaps 
because of capital-labor substitution). 
Figures 1 and 2 present the relationship of states’ 2000 IEI score to capital stock per 
employee (Figure 1) and to capital expenditure per employee (Figure 2), respectively. The 
figures indicate that states with higher IEI scores, meaning more available capital subsidy tools, 
also have higher capital stocks and expenditures per employee. Although these figures do not 
represent a causal relationship, they do suggest that negative and insignificant job effects might 
not be driven by incentives’ failure to induce net new capital. Instead, they suggest that the new 
capital may not increase jobs. 
 
Figure 1  State Capital Stock per Employee and IEI (2000) 
 
NOTE:  Capital stock measured in thousands of 2000 US$. 
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Figure 2  State Capital Expenditure per Employee and IEI (2000) 
 
NOTE: Capital expenditure measured in thousands of 2000 US$. 
SOURCE: Chirinko and Wilson (2009); Patrick (2014a).  
 
 
If capital subsidies induce additional capital without associated increases in jobs, then a 
number of underlying mechanisms may be at work. Induced capital could be redirecting capital 
from productive activities into overcapacity. As suggested by Gabe and Kraybill (2002), 
managers may engage in additional rent-seeking as a result of increased incentive availability 
and make inefficient production decisions. Managers may also adjust to public aid by 
substituting capital or public inputs for labor. Hanson and Rohlin (2011) find that wage subsidies 
induce changes in locations’ industry mix consistent with labor-capital substitution. The results 
from Harger and Ross (2013) regarding the industry effects of new-market tax credits are also 
consistent with subsidy-induced capital-labor substitution. The next section sketches a simple 
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3  EQUILIBRIUM CHANGES WITH SUBSIDIES 
Consider the effect of a capital subsidy on a firm’s optimal choice of capital and labor. 
Capital consists of equipment as well as the structure and land used in production. As discussed 
by McDonald and McMillen (2011), one can think of firm output as a function of equipment, 
labor, and real estate, which includes both land and structure capital.  It is also useful to impose 
Cobb-Douglas production technology, so that 𝑄 = 𝐴𝑅𝛼𝐸𝛽𝑁1−𝛼−𝛽, where 𝑄is a given level of 
output, 𝐸is equipment, 𝑁is labor, and 𝑅is real estate produced by structures 𝑆 and land 𝐿, 
according to the Cobb-Douglas production function 𝑅 = 𝐵𝑆𝜇𝐿1−𝜇. The parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 
govern substitutability of real estate, equipment, and labor in the production of output; while the 
parameter 𝜇 governs the substitutability of land and structure in the production of real estate. 
Assume the prevailing wage rate is 𝑤, the price of equipment capital is 𝑞, the price of structure 
construction is 𝑟, and the price of land is 𝑣. Now consider the optimal levels of labor and capital 
under a capital subsidy regime. Let 𝜏 be a capital subsidy that affects the price of equipment, 
structure, and land capital, such as low-interest financing, capital grants, loan guarantees, cash, 
etc. A profit-maximizing firm sets the ratio of the marginal products of inputs equal to their price 
ratio. Solving for optimal input levels given a target level of output, a profit-maximizing firm 
chooses inputs so that 
(1) 𝑁∗ = (1−𝛼−𝛽)(1−𝜏)
𝛼+𝛽𝐶𝑄
𝑤
  , 
(2) 𝐸∗ = 𝛽𝐶𝑄
𝑞(1−𝜏)1−𝛼−𝛽
  , 
(3) 𝑆∗ = 𝛼𝜇𝐶𝑄
𝑟(1−𝜏)1−𝛼−𝛽
  , and 
(4) 𝐿∗ = 𝛼(1−𝜇)𝐶𝑄
𝑣(1−𝜏)1−𝛼−𝛽
  , 
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 and the price of output is normalized to 
one. Equations (1) – (4) indicate that optimal input choices depend upon capital intensity, the α 
and β parameters, as well as the amount of the subsidy 𝜏. The amount of labor for a given output 
𝑁∗ is decreasing in capital subsidies and capital intensity; while equipment, structure, and land 
capital are increasing in the subsidy. The act of increasing capital subsidies therefore causes 
firms to substitute capital for labor; the degree of substitution depends upon the type-specific 
capital production parameters.  This yields the first empirically testable prediction of the model: 
all else being equal, capital expenditure should be higher in places with more capital subsidies. 





 , depends upon the substitution parameters  α and β  and the amount of the subsidy 




and decreases at a faster rate for those firms that can easily substitute real estate or equipment for 
labor (higher values of 𝛼 and 𝛽, respectively). Similarly, 
𝜕𝑁𝑆
𝜕𝜏
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑁𝐿
𝜕𝜏
< 0, indicating that 
employment density declines as the subsidy increases and that it declines at a faster rate for 
relatively capital-intensive firms. As noted below, the capital expenditure data does not 
differentiate between equipment, structure, and land capital. Given these constraints, the model 
predicts capital expenditure per employee will increase with capital subsidies, and employment 
density will decrease. 
It is easy to see that the optimal ratios of structure to land, equipment to structure, and 
equipment to land are unaffected by a subsidy of that applies equally to all types of capital. 
Subsidies do not alter the capital input mix from the optimal without subsidies. However, capital 
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subsidies that apply differentially to equipment, structures, and land will also induce changes in 
the optimal capital input ratios. Consider, for example, gifts of real estate and real estate 
leaseback agreements that subsidize land and building capital only (albeit at different rates). 
According to this model, such incentives induce firms to decrease labor and equipment to real 
estate ratios while leaving the labor-equipment ratio unchanged. Real estate capital subsidies 
could therefore be associated with decreasing employment densities. On the other hand, a 
subsidy for only equipment capital induces equipment-labor substitution but leaves employment 
density unchanged.  
The above discussion assumes that the price of land 𝑣 behaves like other capital prices. 
Urban theory suggests that land markets differ substantially from equipment and construction 
markets. Within the context of a basic urban model, where land goes to the highest bidder and 
bids are determined by the amount left over after costs, those firms experiencing the largest cost 
reductions should win the bids for land. Setting the firm’s willingness to pay for land (or the 
maximum amount the firm may pay for land and achieve zero economic profits) equal to 
?̅? = 𝑄−𝑤𝑁−(1−𝜏)𝑞𝐸−(1−𝜏)𝑟𝑆(1−𝜏)𝐿  and substituting gives 



















  . 
Equation (5) demonstrates how the effect of the subsidy regime varies by firms’ ability to 
substitute capital for labor. Equation (5) increases in the value of the subsidy 𝜏, and it increases 
faster for relatively capital-intensive firms (higher values of 𝛼 and 𝛽). Relatively capital 
intensive firms’ WTP responds more because total costs decrease more for firms that have less 
ability to substitute away from capital or firms that are more capital-intensive. Capital subsidies 
are therefore most valuable to firms that have little ability to substitute away from capital, and 
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those firms experiencing the largest cost reductions should win the bids for land. As 𝜏 increases, 
firms with higher values of (𝛼 + 𝛽) will outbid firms with lower values, with which they 
compete for land. Thus, as 𝜏 increases, the share of firms in relatively capital-intensive 
industries will increase.4 
Hanson and Rohlin (2011) approximate (𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑖 =
𝐾𝑖
𝐾𝑖+𝑁𝑖
, where 𝐾𝑖 and 𝑁𝑖 are capital 
costs and labor costs, respectively, from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) national income 
and product accounts (NIPA), and i denotes industry. Table 1 presents their approximations.  
 
Table 1 Capital-Labor Substitution Parameter Approximations by SIC Major Division 








SOURCE: Approximations from Hanson and Rohlin (2011).  
 
 
Table 1 suggests that the share of establishments in FIRE, manufacturing,  and 
transportation will increase at the expense of the relatively labor-intensive industries which 
compete for land with these sectors, such as wholesale trade, construction, and retail. The next 
section discusses the strategy and data employed to test these predictions. 
4 It should be noted that if cost savings are fully capitalized into land values, then subsidies induce changes 




                                                 
4  EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
Empirical tests of the theory employ five-year county panels and the IEI to estimate the 
effect of increasing capital subsidy availability on manufacturing capital expenditure and input 
ratios as well as industry establishment shares. Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity and 
macroeconomic industry-time effects and first-differencing yields the following reduced-form 
estimation model: ∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∆𝑋𝑗,𝑡−1′ 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, where i, j, and t index industry, county, and 
time, respectively.  𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the outcome of interest. Manufacturing capital expenditure tests the 
capital prediction; manufacturing capital expenditure per employee and employment density test 
the input ratio predictions; and industry i share of total establishments in county j at time t test 
the industry mix prediction. Lagged independent variables reduce the potential for endogeneity 
and allow decision-makers time to adjust to changes in the county. As discussed in more detail 
below, 𝑋𝑗,𝑡−1′  includes the IEI as well as demographic, earnings, industrial structure, and state 
and local tax and expenditure control variables. 
First-differencing removes time-invariant county and state unobservables and IEI levels 
are used to measure capital subsidy incentives. Hammond and Tosun (2010) assert employment 
factors have different effects in rural and urban areas. Partridge, Rickman, and Li  (2009) and 
Patrick (2014a) also suggest that rural and urban areas respond differently to job creation stimuli. 
Thus, the paper analyzes rural and urban counties separately as well as counties in multistate 
MSAs.  
Section 6 contains several robustness checks. First, panels are limited to counties that 
share a state border, and ∆𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∆𝑋𝑗,𝑡−1′ 𝛽 + 𝑎𝑗𝑘 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is estimated. The vector 𝑎𝑗𝑘 is a 
vector of border fixed effects for every shared state border in the sample. For example, Georgia 
shares borders with Florida, Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. A border 
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fixed effect is included for each of these. The specification therefore compares counties on either 
side of the borders, and identification comes from differences in policy within the border areas. 
Border fixed effects combined with first-differencing effectively make this specification a border 
fixed effects random trend specification, where time-invariant unobservables are removed and 
each border area is allowed to have its own growth rate.  
Alternative measures constructed from state constitutional provisions are employed to 
check robustness of results to the implicit assumptions associated with using the IEI. The IEI 
sums individual clause scores to reflect substitution between covered incentives. Summing 
implicitly assumes incentive types have equal marginal effects, which may be a strong 
assumption. The sensitivity of results to this assumption is explored with estimates using a 
weighted IEI, where weights are determined using principal component factor analysis. Principal 
component factor analysis assumes that each of the clause scores reflects an underlying latent 
variable. In this case, the underlying latent variable could be broadly interpreted as the ability to 
aid private enterprises with public capital subsidies. Using the variation in the data, the exercise 
weights each clause score according to its contribution to the underlying latent variable.5  
The empirical strategy assumes that the effects of increasing capital subsidies are linear. 
It is, however, possible that there are diminishing returns to the effects of capital subsidies. It is 
also possible that providing too many capital subsidies sends a negative business climate signal 
or raises concerns over state and local government subsidy–induced revenue shortfalls. If any of 
these are true, then the effects will be nonlinear.  An alternative specification employing a set of 
indicator variables for relative position in the IEI distribution allows for this possibility. 
Percentile indicators also alleviate concerns that firms might not be able to differentiate between 
5 Results presented herein use the state variation to construct the factor weighted IEI. Results using the 
county variation were similar and available from the author upon request. Using the county variation implicitly 
weights each state’s score by the number of counties in the state. Thus, the state variation is preferred.  
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small changes in capital subsidies by allowing behavior to vary according to relative position in 
the distribution of capital subsidy packages. 
4.1  Data 
The panel data for counties in the lower 48 states was obtained from the U.S. Census 
Bureau and the BEA. Data availability and consistency determined the periods of analysis. The 
five-year panel includes data from 1972 to 1997.  
The Census of Manufactures provides data on aggregate county manufacturing capital 
expenditure. Results for manufacturing capital expenditure and manufacturing capital 
expenditure per employee utilize the 1982–1997 Census of Manufactures for the dependent 
variable. Unfortunately, publicly available Census of Manufactures data from earlier years does 
not include information on capital expenditures. Census Bureau county business patterns from 
1977 to 1997 supply data on industry shares of establishments and employment by Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) major division.6 Industry is defined by two-digit SIC codes.  
Control variables for wages and industrial structure are constructed from BEA data. 
Wage and salary employment per square mile of land measures employment density. Wage and 
salary earnings per employed person measure wages. Finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE); 
manufacturing; farm; service; and military sector shares are calculated by dividing the total 
number of employees in each SIC division by total county employment in the BEA data. Only 
the manufacturing capital expenditure and manufacturing capital expenditure per employee 
specifications use these employment shares as control variables. 
6 The county business patterns data suppress employment in some two-digit SIC industries. Suppressed 
employment data were imputed using the employment size classes of establishments in the county, as well as 
national average employment by establishment size class in the two-digit SIC industry. 
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Local government taxes and services are clearly important in the theoretical context of 
spatial equilibrium with incentives. In practice, the tax rates and services in a location are 
determined by state government policy as well as local government policy. Thus, state and local 
measures for the tax and service variables combine state and local data. State variables are 
calculated from the Census Bureau’s state tax collections and state government finance data, as 
well as BEA’s state gross domestic product estimates. Local measures are calculated using data 
from the Census Bureau’s Census of Governments (CG). The CG data covers all governmental 
units in the United States. Local measures aggregate all government units within a county in the 
1972–1997 CG data. In addition to tax and expenditure measures, state and local outstanding 
debt is also included. The rich set of state and local government finance variables control for 
other types of economic development programming not captured by the IEI, as well as fiscal 
capacity constraints. 
Tables A.1 and A.2 provide a summary of the variables across panels. 
The package of incentives offered in a particular location reflects local economic 
conditions, local taxes, the incentive packages offered by competing communities, and the “rules 
of the game” as dictated by federal and state constitutions. Including detail controls for the 
former two determinants allows isolation of the nontax incentive effects. Using the IEI as the 
measure for capital subsidy availability captures both available programs and the limits of 
jurisdictional response to competing offers.  
Patrick (2014a) creates the IEI from state constitutional provisions on aid to private 
entities. Specifically, IEI is the sum of the state and local scores for three constitutional clauses 
governing public aid to private enterprises—typically referred to as the credit, current 
appropriations, and stock clauses.  These state constitutional provisions on aid to private entities 
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provide a structural constraint on the ability of state and local governments to provide incentives. 
The provisions limit and structure the types of incentives a jurisdiction in the state may provide, 
as well as bounding jurisdictional ability to match and innovate in response to economic 
circumstances and competing offers. The provisions originated in the nineteenth century from 
public participation in failed economic development projects. The resulting fiscal consequences 
of public investment in risky private ventures included long-term debt obligations, default, and 
bankruptcy.7 In response, states throughout the United States enacted constitutional reforms that 
constrained legislative promotion of economic development and created barriers to prevent 
abuses (Patrick 2014b; Tarr 1998). Because of differences in the instigating events, constraints 
are remarkably heterogeneous. State constitutional provisions enacted in response to historic 
events are relevant to today’s competitive environment. As shown in Patrick (2014a), the types 
of programs available in locations across the United States are a direct reflection of the limits 
placed by these constitutional provisions.  
To illustrate the relationship between constitutional provisions and available capital 
subsidies, consider Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 details the score for each component of the IEI as 
well as the summary score in five states that often compete for economic development projects: 
Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. A higher score means more 
freedom to use the incentives covered by that clause. There are separate scores for state 
governmental entities and local governmental entities, reflecting differential limitations within a 
state at these levels of government. The current appropriations provisions govern donations as 
7 In states with few constitutional restrictions, these types of fiscal consequences remain a risk for state and 
local governments (Patrick 2014b). Consider, for example, Rhode Island, which has one of the least restrictive 
constitutions. Competing with Massachusetts for Curt Schilling’s now defunct Studio 38 video game company, 
Rhode Island provided a rich incentive package that included $75 million in state guaranteed financing. The state 
must continue to repay the debt for the failed venture, which has led to significant public debate on incentive 
practices in the state (Bray 2012; Cohan 2012).  
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well as loans financed through general fund revenue. The ability to use incentive programs 
financed through credit obligations and the lending of public credit for private purposes are 
constrained by credit clauses. Stock clauses govern equity incentives, such as public-private 
partnerships and public venture capital funds, that imbue the public with a form of ownership in 
private companies. The constitutional provisions govern both the source and the use of funds for 
economic development incentives; the IEI distinguishes the way in which the program is 
financed as well as the program type (Patrick 2015).  
 
Table 2  State Constitutional Incentive Environment Index Scores 
 AL GA NC SC TN 
State credit 20 12 13 19 13 
State current appropriations 15 14 23 23 23 
State stock 5 8 17 8 9 
Local credit 22 11 22 21 20 
Local current appropriations  24 0 25 25 25 
Local stock 19 20 20 6 19 
Incentives environment index 105 50 120 102 109 
SOURCE: Patrick (2015). 
 
 
Table 3 summarizes the available types of nontax economic development incentive 
programs operated by state (not local) governments in these states. Comparing the types of 
programs reveals some variation in source and use of funds; however, it is important to note that 
it does not capture all the variation in the IEI. The effects of constitutional variations in Table 2 
can be readily gleaned from Table 3. Georgia has the lowest IEI score in Table 2. It also offers 
the fewest types of programs in Table 3.  
Consider, for example, cash and property inducements. The Table 2 current 
appropriations score reflects the fact that the Georgia state constitution prohibits gifts to private 
enterprises. Table 3 indicates that Georgia does not operate any direct grant economic 
development incentive programs. Such inducements are permitted by the North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Tennessee constitutions, and Table 3 indicates that all three states operate direct   
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Table 3  State Economic Development Incentive Program Types  





Grants or donations to private entities   X X X 
Grants or donations to public and quasi−public entities  X X X X X 
Loans to private X  X X X 
Loans to public and quasi−public  X X  X 
Private loan guarantees and participation X     
Private loan guarantees and participation through 
public or quasi−public conduit 
 X X X  
Other preferential rate financing through public or 
quasi−public conduit 





Private equity   X   
Private equity via public or quasi−public conduit X   X X 
NOTE:  The classification of economic development incentive type presented here does not distinguish the funding source for the 
program. Programs financed through public debt and current appropriations are grouped together. The incentives environment 
index further distinguishes between program types by considering both the source and the use of funds. In other words, the IEI 
distinguishes both the way in which the program is financed as well as the program type. The inventory does not include local 
programs, nor does it distinguish between programs by subrecipient end use. Program inventory excludes federal funds programs 
such as Community Development Block Grants, Appalachian Regional Commission programs, the Tennessee Valley Authority, 
the U.S. State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) program, Small Business Administration programs, etc. The inventory 
also excludes customized worker training programs administered through public institutions, such as Georgia QuickStart and 
North Carolina’s Customized Training Program. 
SOURCE: Patrick (2015). 
 
 
grant programs.  Table 3 reports that all states operate public grant programs for economic 
development. The local current appropriations scores in Table 2 also reveal variation in the way 
in which local governments may use state grants to aid private enterprises.  For example, both 
the OneGeorgia EDGE Fund and the Tennessee FastTrack Economic Development Fund provide 
funds to local governments and development authorities to finance the purchase of equipment in 
aid of a private company. Georgia constitutional restrictions on local development authorities 
require that the authority retain ownership of the equipment financed by OneGeorgia and lease it 
to the company. On the other hand, a local authority receiving FastTrack funds may either 
reimburse the company for its purchase of the equipment or donate the equipment to the firm.  
The IEI provides both a measure of available programming and the limits of response. A 
measure of incentives created from constitutional provisions avoids the aforementioned 
endogeneity problems and exploits the dynamics of incentives competition. The constraints in 
state constitutional provisions are binding, prompting attempts to amend or revise them. 
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Constitutional amendment and revision generally requires several steps, often culminating in 
voter referendums. Results of recent votes on amendments reveal that voters are not always 
supportive of increasing available nontax incentives. For example, many state constitutions 
prohibit public issuance of general obligation bonds whose proceeds benefit private 
organizations. Three states amended their constitutions in 2010 to allow public entities to use 
general obligation bonds to finance economic development incentives; however, Texas voters 
rejected a proposed amendment to expand county government issuance of general obligation 
bonds for economic development in 2011 (Dinan 2011, 2012; Patrick 2014b). 
More than one-third of the states changed their constitutions at least once during the 
study period, with approximately 30 percent changing multiple times (Patrick 2014). 
Amendments tend to result from political movements focused on the role of government, 
political pressures associated with so-called corporate welfare, and competitive pressures to 
provide the new relevant baseline incentives (Patrick 2014a; Tarr 1998). State constitutional 
amendments of this nature are not as obviously endogenous to local economic conditions as 
other potential measures, particularly considering that it is unlikely any single county’s economic 
conditions will exert enough influence to induce state constitutional amendment. The empirical 
strategy employs county-level data and differences out state and local unobservables, which 
alleviate any remaining identification concerns.  
5  RESULTS 
5.1  Manufacturing Capital and Input Ratios 
Table 4 reports the estimated medium-term change in manufacturing capital expenditure 
from a one-point increase in the IEI, which is a very small change in policy tools. Standardized 
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beta coefficients are shown in brackets to ease comparison. Columns correspond to separate 
regressions for each subsample of counties, with column 1 presenting results for the pooled 
county sample, columns 2 and 3 containing estimates for the samples of rural and urban counties, 
respectively, and column 4 corresponding to the sample of counties in multistate MSAs. The 
estimated sign and magnitudes for control variables are reasonable. More expensive labor is 
associated with the largest increase in county manufacturing capital expenditure, while the 
effective corporate tax rate is associated with the largest decrease. Increasing capital subsidies 
increases manufacturing capital expenditure, as predicted by theory. However, the effect varies 
across samples.  
Table 4, column 1, indicates that a one-point increase in the IEI is associated with an 
imprecisely measured manufacturing capital expenditure increase of $39,590. Columns 2–4 
reveal that the pooled border county panel masks heterogeneity in the effects for rural and urban 
counties and splitting the samples increases precision.  Table 4, column 2, indicates that rural 
county manufacturing increases by $17,750 with a one-point increase in the IEI. A one-standard-
deviation increase in the IEI increases rural county manufacturing capital expenditure by 
$424,468, or 4.62 percent of the average rural expenditure. 
The urban border county results in Table 4 indicate that a one-point increase in the IEI is 
associated with a manufacturing capital expenditure increase of $183,800. A one-standard-
deviation increase in the IEI therefore increases manufacturing capital expenditure by 
$3,462,757 in urban counties, or 3.1 percent of average urban county manufacturing capital 
expenditure and 12 percent of the average change.  The last column of Table 4 presents the 
estimated effect when the sample is restricted to counties in multistate MSAs. The point 
estimates more than double the point estimates from the urban county sample. The increase is   
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Table 4  Changes in Counties' Manufacturing Capital Expenditure Associated with Additional Capital 
Subsidies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Rural Urban MSA 
IEI 39.59 17.75** 183.8* 371.2*** 
 [0.0140] [0.0237]** [0.0344]* [0.102]*** 
 (30.18) (9.006) (102.3) (116.2) 
Working-age share −135,291 29,181 −377,904 −583,980 
 [−0.0151] [0.0123] [−0.0221] [−0.0530] 
 (95,301) (30,998) (365,113) (378,769) 
Minority share 555,394*** 9,504 882,291** 234,816 
 [0.0781]*** [0.00441] [0.0805]** [0.0363] 
 (150,208) (17,947) (350,820) (185,535) 
Earnings per employee 6,413*** 729.4** 9,900*** 10,081*** 
 [0.141]*** [0.0581]** [0.110]*** [0.205]*** 
 (1,291) (360.9) (3,729) (2,510) 
Effective corp. tax rate −421,731*** −141,305*** −1.438e+06*** −558,189 
 [−0.0590]*** [−0.0776]*** [−0.0952]*** [−0.0509] 
 (100,946) (49,767) (487,148) (389,537) 
Property tax rate 289,178*** 19,664 1.553e+06*** −52,045 
 [0.0365]*** [0.0101] [0.0790]*** [−0.00411] 
 (83,503) (31,781) (572,103) (538,601) 
Sales tax rate 489,642** 219,066** 1.294e+06 −1.343e+06 
 [0.0264]** [0.0467]** [0.0325] [−0.0563] 
 (247,264) (102,034) (1.118e+06) (1.077e+06) 
Indiv. income tax rate −875,215*** −24,954 −3.362e+06*** 129,119 
 [−0.0368]*** [−0.00398] [−0.0744]*** [0.00396] 
 (328,732) (83,405) (1.182e+06) (1.109e+06) 
K–12 expenditure −45,163 16,008 −329,005 60,133 
 [−0.00856] [0.0123] [−0.0254] [0.00790] 
 (40,058) (16,744) (308,436) (264,388) 
Public safety expend. 202,890 −88,831 1.743e+06 −1.520e+06 
 [0.0163] [−0.0270] [0.0745] [−0.104] 
 (269,345) (95,611) (1.094e+06) (1.125e+06) 
Highway expenditure −118,302 −5,897 −393,247 617,665 
 [−0.00936] [−0.00195] [−0.0101] [0.0281] 
 (123,420) (35,222) (1.061e+06) (521,268) 
Outstanding debt 1,483 880.2 7,052 1,055 
 [0.00381] [0.00952] [0.00555] [0.00267] 
 (1,799) (1,072) (16,879) (3,805) 
County industry shares Y Y Y Y 
Time fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
N 7,514 5,712 1,802 793 
NOTE: The table reports results from four separate regressions. Column headings correspond to the sample, with column (1) 
presenting results for the pooled county sample, columns (2) and (3) containing estimates for the samples of rural and urban 
counties, respectively, and column (4) corresponding to the sample of counties in multistate MSAs. The dependent variable is 
county manufacturing capital expenditure, measured in $000s. State and local tax and expenditures are measured relative to 
personal income, with the exception of the state effective corporate tax rate, which is measured relative to gross state product. 
Standardized beta coefficients are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the county level are shown in parentheses. * 
significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
substantial: one standard deviation is associated with over $8.3 million in additional 
manufacturing capital expenditure (approximately 11 percent of sample county manufacturing 
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capital expenditure and 38 percent of the average change in the sample).  Capital subsidies 
appear most effective at inducing capital expenditure across state borders in the same urban area. 
Table 5 reports the change in manufacturing capital expenditure per employee and 
employment density for the same samples of counties. An increase in the IEI is associated with 
increased manufacturing capital expenditure per employee and decreased employment density, 
which is consistent with theoretical predictions about subsidy-induced capital-labor substitution. 
Table 5 also suggests that the effects vary substantially between rural and urban areas, with the 
largest effects occurring in urban areas. The last column of Panel A in Table 5 indicates that a 
one-standard-deviation increase in capital subsidy availability increases capital expenditure per 
employee by $247, or 6 percent of mean multistate MSA county expenditure per employee and 
16 percent of the average change. Panel B, column 3, indicates five fewer employees per square 
mile of land with a one-standard-deviation increase in the IEI in urban counties.  
 
 
Table 5  Changes in Counties’ Input Ratios Associated with Additional Capital Subsidies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Rural Urban MSA 
Panel A: Manufacturing capital expenditure per employee 
IEI 0.00650*** 0.00455** 0.0112*** 0.0110** 
 [0.0313]*** [0.0240]** [0.0457]*** [0.0581]** 
 (0.00192) (0.00215) (0.00415) (0.00522) 
Panel B: Employment density 
IEI −0.0782*** −0.0106*** −0.199** −0.137 
 [−0.0415]*** [−0.0602]*** [−0.0525]** [−0.0254] 
 (0.0205) (0.00382) (0.0815) (0.159) 
NOTE: The table reports results from eight separate regressions. Column headings correspond to the sample, with column (1) 
presenting results for the pooled county sample, columns (2) and (3) containing estimates for the samples of rural and urban 
counties, respectively, and column (4) corresponding to the sample of counties in multi−state MSAs. The Panel A dependent 
variable is county manufacturing capital expenditure (measured in $000s) per manufacturing employee. The dependent variable 
in Panel B is total wage and salary employment per square mile of land area. Controls include variables for county demographics, 
average earnings, and industrial structure as well as measures for state and local government tax rates, expenditures, and 
outstanding debt. Standardized beta coefficients are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the county level are shown in 





5.2 County Two-Digit SIC Establishment Shares by Major Division 
The results in Section 5.1 indicate significant differences in the effects for rural and urban 
counties. This section therefore presents results separately for rural and urban samples. Estimates 
for pooled samples are available in Appendix A.2. Table 6, Panels A, B, and C, present the 
estimated change in industry shares of establishments by SIC major division for rural, urban, and 
multistate MSA counties, respectively. The unit of analysis is industry share, where industry is 
defined by two-digit SIC codes. Sample sizes vary by SIC major division because the number of 
two-digit SIC codes varies between divisions.  
5.2.1  Rural counties 
Table 6, Panel A, presents the estimated change in rural county industry establishment 
shares by SIC industry major division. Table 6, Panel A, indicates that a significant increase in 
the IEI is associated with an increase in manufacturing, transportation, FIRE, and service 
establishment shares at the expense of wholesale trade and construction. Manufacturing, 
transportation, and FIRE are relatively capital-intensive compared to relatively labor-intensive 
wholesale trade and construction industries. The results in Table 6, Panel A, are consistent with 
the prediction that capital-intensive firms will outbid labor-intensive firms for land.  
Zoning regulations and differential site requirements mean that firms compete for land 
with other firms in a subset of industry major divisions (as opposed to all firms). For example, 
manufacturing firms likely compete with other manufacturing firms as well as wholesale trade 
firms for land. It is unlikely, however, that manufacturing firms compete with retail firms for the 
same land. Table 6, Panel A, therefore indicates that the share of relatively capital-intensive 
manufacturing establishments increases at the expense of relatively labor-intensive wholesale 
trade firms. The average rural county experienced a decrease in manufacturing establishment 
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shares over the period, making the estimated increase associated with capital subsidies 
particularly important.  
The increase in service establishment shares is not entirely consistent with theoretical 
predictions. The service SIC major division contains a wide variety of two-digit industries. It is 
therefore plausible that relatively capital-intensive two-digit industries drive the increase in 
service establishment shares. Alternatively, service firms may experience unmodeled cost 
decreases from positive externalities generated by capital-intensive industries. It also seems 
plausible that service establishments don’t compete with manufacturing and transportation firms 
for land because of zoning regulations and differential site requirements.  
In results not shown, estimates suggest rural employment shares increased for 
manufacturing, transportation, and FIRE, while wholesale trade and retail employment shares 
decreased. These results are consistent with the establishment share findings in that relatively 
capital-intensive industries increased employment shares at the expense of relatively labor-
intensive industries. Estimates of manufacturing employment per establishment also indicate that 
capital-labor substitution decreases employment per manufacturing establishment.8 This suggests 
that relatively capital-intensive firms are crowding out firms in labor-intensive sectors, which 
increases their share of employment. Consistent with previous studies’ findings that incentives 
do not support local job growth, replacing labor-intensive firms with capital-intensive firms 
would result in lower levels of overall employment in rural counties.  
8 Results are available in earlier versions of the paper or upon request from the author. 
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Table 6  Effect of Increasing the IEI on Counties’ Two−Digit SIC Shares of Establishments by Major Division 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Construction Manufacturing Transportation Wholesale Trade Retail FIRE Services 
Panel A: Rural counties 
IEI −0.0005* 0.0007*** 0.0003** −0.0018*** 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 
 [−0.0086]* [0.0290]*** [0.0097]** [−0.0320]*** [0.0012] [0.0115]*** [0.0101]*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
N 26,474 69,972 37,921 27,921 64,280 46,501 102,615 
R−squared 0.1463 0.0348 0.0421 0.0522 0.0627 0.1175 0.2289 
Panel B: Urban counties 
IEI 0.0005 0.0001** −0.0000 −0.0014*** 0.0005** −0.0001 0.0002* 
 [0.0127] [0.0179]** [−0.0001] [−0.0620]*** [0.0174]** [−0.0081] [0.0068]* 
 (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
N 7,451 36,599 14,869 7,467 17,413 16,672 32,437 
R−squared 0.3726 0.0533 0.0669 0.1276 0.1840 0.2203 0.4941 
Panel C: Multistate MSA counties 
IEI 0.0021** 0.0004*** −0.0001 −0.0017*** 0.0005 −0.0005 −0.0001 
 [0.0375]** [0.0303]*** [−0.0056] [−0.0486]*** [0.0124] [−0.0181] [−0.0034] 
 (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
N 3,356 14,083 6,146 3,428 7,954 7,015 14,114 
R−squared 0.3361 0.0332 0.0483 0.1216 0.1197 0.1487 0.3691 
NOTE: The table reports the results of 21 separate regressions. Panels correspond to the sample of counties. Column headings correspond to SIC major division. The unit of 
analysis is the two-digit SIC industry share of total county establishments. Control variables include measures for county demographics and average earnings as well as measures 
for state and local government tax rates, expenditures, and outstanding debt. Standardized beta coefficients are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the county level are 







5.2.2  Urban and multistate MSA counties 
As expected, increasing capital subsidy availability has somewhat different effects in 
urban counties as opposed to rural counties. Table 6, Panel B, presents the change in 
establishment and employment shares associated with an increase in the IEI for the sample of 
urban counties that share a border with another state, while Table 6, Panel C, reports results for 
the sample of counties located in multistate MSAs. The effects of increasing capital subsidy 
availability are very similar for the two samples of urban counties. 
In the full sample, urban counties experienced an increase in manufacturing, retail, and 
service establishment shares and a decrease in wholesale trade shares. The manufacturing and 
wholesale trade results are consistent with the theory that manufacturing establishments compete 
with wholesale trade establishments for the same land and that subsidy-induced cost savings 
allow manufacturing to outbid wholesale trade. The increase in retail trade and service 
establishment shares is unexpected given the theory, but it may suggest some positive spillovers 
between manufacturing and these sectors in urban areas. The service sector results may also be 
driven by relatively capital-intensive two-digit industries. Recall that the rural county results 
indicated potential positive spillovers between the services sector and manufacturing. Thus, these 
results also suggest that manufacturing may generate different externalities in rural and urban 
areas, perhaps because of different forward/backward linkages. 
In results not shown, increasing the capital subsidy tools is associated with an increase in 
construction and retail employment shares in urban counties. This is consistent with the increase 
in construction and retail establishment shares in Panel B. Construction and retail cannot easily 
substitute capital for labor. Thus, an increase in their establishment shares associated with capital 
subsidies would be expected to increase their employment shares. There is not a significant 
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change in the other industries’ employment shares. Although manufacturing establishment shares 
increased with capital subsidies, the establishment share increase is not associated with a 
significant increase in employment shares. This is consistent with the capital-labor substitution 
predicted by theory and the estimated changes in manufacturing capital expenditure. 
Manufacturing employment per establishment also decreases as urban counties’ package of 
capital subsidies increases, further supporting subsidy-induced capital-labor substitution.  
Table 6, Panel C, reports estimates for another set of urban counties, counties in 
multistate MSAs. Panel C confirms urban counties experience an increase in manufacturing 
establishment shares at the expense of wholesale trade establishment the IEI increases. This is 
also congruent with the theory that manufacturing and wholesale trade establishments compete 
for the same land and the cost decrease from capital subsidies allows manufacturing firms to 
outbid wholesale trade firms for land. The increase in construction establishments again suggests 
some positive spillovers between construction and manufacturing in urban areas, perhaps 
because of capital subsidy–induced investments in building capital.  
The employment share results suggest that there were no significant changes in 
employment shares. Given the increase in manufacturing establishment shares associated with 
capital subsidies, lack of employment effects indicate subsidy-induced capital-labor substitution. 
Employment per establishment decreases in manufacturing firms. This is consistent with 
theoretical predictions about capital-labor substitution.   
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6 ALTERNATIVE EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND IEI MEASURES  
6.1 Border Random Trend Estimates 
Table 7 reports the effect of increasing capital subsidy tools on manufacturing capital 
expenditure, manufacturing capital expenditure per employee, and employment density 
identified by differences between counties that share a state border. The results confirm the 
findings from Section 5. Table 7, Panel A, indicates a significant increase in capital expenditure 
associated with an increase in the IEI in the pooled border, urban border, and multistate MSA 
county samples. The largest effects are for urban border and multistate MSA counties, with an 
estimated increase of $10,101, 069 and $9,003,490, respectively, from a one-standard-deviation 
increase in the IEI. The rural effect from Section 5 disappears, bolstering the conclusion that 
capital subsidies are most effective at inducing new capital expenditure across state borders in 
urban counties. Consistent with theoretical predictions regarding input ratios, there is increased 
capital expenditure per employee (Panel B) and decreasing employment density (Panel C) in the 
counties on the side of state borders with higher capital subsidies. 
Border random trend estimates for rural, urban, and multistate MSA counties’ change in 
industry establishment shares are presented in Table 8, Panels A–C, respectively. The results 
largely corroborate the findings in Section 5. As capital subsidy packages increase, relatively 
capital-intensive manufacturing shares increase at the expense of wholesale trade shares. The 
positive effects on urban retail industry shares from Table 6 are also found in Table 8, Panels B 
and C. Rural border-county retail shares, however, decrease with capital subsidies as predicted 
by theory.  Table 8 also reports increases in construction industry shares associated with an 
increase in the IEI, perhaps suggesting subsidy-induced increases in demand for building capital, 




Table 8  Border Random Trend Estimates of the Effect of IEI on Counties’ Two−Digit SIC Share of Establishments by Major Division 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Construction Manufacturing Transportation Wholesale trade Retail FIRE Services 
Panel A: Rural border counties  
IEI 0.0012* 0.0005* 0.0004 −0.0002 −0.0007** 0.0002 0.0004** 
 (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Observations 11,464 30,602 16,749 12,153 27,909 20,338 44,970 
R−squared 0.1723 0.0400 0.0402 0.0864 0.0699 0.1352 0.2366 
Panel B: Urban border counties 
IEI 0.0020* 0.0000 −0.0000 −0.0014*** 0.0009* −0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Observations 3,184 15,645 6,448 3,212 7,524 7,138 13,900 
R−squared 0.4426 0.0642 0.0885 0.1447 0.1750 0.1765 0.4873 
Panel C: Multistate MSA counties 
IEI 0.0026** 0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0010 0.0010* −0.0006 0.0001 
 (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Observations 3,356 14,083 6,146 3,428 7,954 7,015 14,114 
R−squared 0.3489 0.0388 0.0572 0.1316 0.1234 0.1538 0.3703 
NOTE: The table reports the results of 21 separate regressions. Panels correspond to the sample of border counties. Column headings correspond to SIC major division. The unit of 
analysis is the two−digit SIC industry share of total county establishments. Control variables include measures for county demographics and average earnings as well as measures 
for state and local government tax rates, expenditures, and outstanding debt. Standardized beta coefficients are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the county level are 







6.2 Factor-Weighted IEI 
This section explores the sensitivity of results to the assumption that the types of 
incentives covered under each clause have equal marginal effects. Estimates employ a weighted 
IEI, where weights are determined using principal component factor analysis. For the IEI, the 
scoring coefficients for Factor 1 weight the local current appropriations clause most heavily, 
followed by the local credit clause, local stock clause, and the state current appropriations clause. 
Current appropriations activities include cash, grants, site development, and other aid from the 
general fund. For example, a location with a low current appropriations clause score is 
constitutionally prohibited from buying land to give to a company; while a location with a high 
current appropriations clause score could. The heavy weights given to the local credit clause and 
local stock clause suggests that low-cost financing through local government is an important 
capital subsidy as well, although less so than local government current appropriations. Thus, the 
IEI Factor 1 considers current appropriations and local financial partnerships as the most 
important capital subsidies. The state credit and stock clauses receive large weights in Factor 2. 
Factor 2 could therefore be interpreted as capturing financial partnerships with the state. Tables 9 
and 10 present results using the IEI factors.  
Table 9 contains the results for manufacturing capital expenditure (Panel A), 
manufacturing capital expenditure per employee (Panel B), and employment density (Panel C). 
An increase in the IEI Factor 1—the current appropriation and local financial partnership 
factor—is associated with an increase in manufacturing capital expenditure and capital 
expenditure per employee in all samples. This is consistent with theoretical predictions and the 
results from Tables 4 and 5, above. Again, pooling urban and rural counties averages much 





NOTE: The table reports results from 12 separate regressions. Column headings correspond to the sample, with column (1) presenting results for the pooled county sample, 
columns (2) and (3) containing estimates for the samples of rural and urban counties, respectively, and column (4) corresponding to the sample of counties in multistate MSAs. The 
Panel A dependent variable is county manufacturing capital expenditure measured in $000s. Panel B presents results for manufacturing capital expenditure (measured in $000s) per 
employee. The dependent variable in Panel C is total wage and salary employment per square mile of land area. Controls include variables for county demographics, average 
earnings, and industrial structure as well as measures for state and local government tax rates, expenditure, and outstanding debt. Standardized beta coefficients are shown in 




Table 9 Changes in Counties’ Manufacturing Capital Associated with Additional Factor-Weighted Capital Subsidy Availability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All Rural Urban Multistate MSA 
Panel A: Manufacturing capital 
IEI Factor 1 1,436** 471.2** 6,332** 9,040*** 
 (712.1) (191.8) (2,468) (2,996) 
IEI Factor 2 −871.5 −55.05 −2,687 1,590 
 (645.3) (217.6) (2,515) (2,440) 
Panel B: Manufacturing capital expenditure per employee 
IEI Factor 1 0.176*** 0.147*** 0.237** 0.246** 
 (0.0448) (0.0476) (0.0934) (0.110) 
IEI Factor 2 −0.00315 −0.0504 0.135 0.0857 
 (0.0515) (0.0572) (0.113) (0.145) 
Panel C: Employment density 
IEI Factor 1 −1.189*** −0.206** −2.118 −0.161 
 (0.443) (0.0808) (1.869) (3.247) 
IEI Factor 2 −1.934*** −0.181** −6.774*** −9.674* 
 (0.622) (0.0758) (2.525) (5.228) 
 
 
indicates that an increase in the IEI factor increases manufacturing capital expenditure by more 
than $9 million.  Employment density decreases with an increase in both IEI factors (Table 9, 
Panel C), as predicted. 
Table 10 reports the results for county industry establishment shares by major division 
for the rural, urban, and multistate MSA county samples in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. The 
results generally confirm the findings from Section 5. Table 10, Panel A, reveals that increasing 
capital subsidy availability is associated with increased manufacturing, transportation, FIRE, and 
service establishment shares at the expense of wholesale trade and construction in rural border 
counties. Urban counties experienced an increase in manufacturing establishment shares 
associated with an increase in both IEI factors (Table 10, Panels B and C). Like the earlier 
results, Table 10 indicates their increase comes at the expense of wholesale trade establishment 
shares. Again, this is consistent with manufacturing firms outbidding wholesale trade firms with 
whom they compete for land. There is also some indication of unmodeled positive externalities 
between manufacturing and the construction and retail industries in urban counties.  
6.3  IEI Percentile Indicators 
Tables 11 and 12 present results allowing for potential nonlinearities and concerns about 
small differences in the IEI. The variables of interest are indicator variables for the counties’ 
position in the IEI distribution. The omitted category is the indicator variable for counties with 
IEI scores less than the twenty-fifth percentile score, representing the most restrictive capital 
subsidy environments in the distribution.  
Table 11 presents the change in counties’ manufacturing capital and input mixes 
associated with each IEI percentile category. The results indicate no significant changes in 




Table 10  Changes in Counties’ Establishment Shares Associated with Additional Factor-Weighted Capital Subsidy Availability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Construction Manufacturing Transportation Wholesale trade Retail FIRE Services 
Panel A: Rural border counties 
IEI Factor 1 0.0072 0.0136*** 0.0028 −0.0239*** 0.0006 0.0043** 0.0113*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0056) (0.0037) (0.0022) (0.0020) 
IEI Factor 2 −0.0384*** 0.0107*** 0.0108*** −0.0410*** 0.0020 0.0085*** 0.0015 
 (0.0073) (0.0022) (0.0038) (0.0109) (0.0042) (0.0023) (0.0020) 
Panel B: Urban border counties 
IEI Factor 1 0.0074 0.0026* −0.0027 −0.0281*** 0.0161*** −0.0030 0.0030 
 (0.0091) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0051) (0.0057) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
IEI Factor 2 0.0112 0.0023 0.0053** −0.0176*** −0.0034 −0.0006 0.0062*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0054) (0.0044) (0.0028) (0.0022) 
Panel C: Multi−state MSA counties 
IEI Factor 1 0.0422** 0.0082*** −0.0030 −0.0307*** 0.0159* −0.0092 −0.0037 
 (0.0186) (0.0029) (0.0048) (0.0100) (0.0081) (0.0056) (0.0042) 
IEI Factor 2 0.0311 0.0021 0.0014 −0.0242** −0.0113 −0.0009 0.0023 
 (0.0193) (0.0025) (0.0052) (0.0121) (0.0089) (0.0081) (0.0045) 
NOTE: The table reports the results of 21 separate regressions. Panels correspond to the sample of counties. Column headings correspond to SIC major division. The unit of 
analysis is the two−digit SIC industry share of total county establishments. Control variables include measures for county demographics and average earnings as well as measures 
for state and local government tax rates, expenditure, and outstanding debt. Standardized beta coefficients are shown in brackets. Standard errors clustered at the county level are 






Table 11 Changes in Counties’ Manufacturing Capital Associated with Capital Subsidy Availability Percentile Indicators 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All counties Rural Urban Multistate MSA 
Panel A: Capital expenditure 
25th–50th percentile −1,286 −348.7 −1,011 3,086 
 (2,255) (520.5) (8,019) (6,990) 
50th–75th percentile 6,304** 1,547*** 21,446** 28,872*** 
 (2,538) (510.0) (8,793) (8,968) 
IEI ≥ 75th percentile 314.4 870.7 446.7 13,696** 
 (1,981) (601.7) (7,497) (6,492) 
Panel B: Capital expenditure per employee 
25th–50th percentile 0.213 0.112 0.425 0.353 
 (0.137) (0.144) (0.312) (0.403) 
50th–75th percentile 0.605*** 0.441*** 0.936*** 1.187*** 
 (0.119) (0.123) (0.290) (0.366) 
IEI ≥ 75th percentile 0.280** 0.176 0.513 0.462 
 (0.139) (0.142) (0.349) (0.336) 
Panel C: Employment density 
25th–50th percentile −2.487* −0.966*** −1.160 20.32* 
 (1.463) (0.210) (6.598) (10.49) 
50th–75th percentile −2.926*** −0.657*** −5.322 5.903 
 (0.979) (0.209) (4.378) (7.414) 
IEI ≥ 75th percentile −3.458** −0.319 −10.98 −2.529 
 (1.394) (0.220) (6.762) (9.281) 
NOTE: The table reports results from eight separate regressions. Column headings correspond to the sample, with column (1) presenting results for the pooled border county 
sample, columns (2) and (3) containing estimates for the samples of rural and urban border counties, respectively, and column (4) corresponding to the sample of counties in 
multistate MSAs. The Panel A dependent variable is county manufacturing capital expenditure, measured in $000s. Panel B presents results for manufacturing capital expenditure 
(measured in $000s) per employee. The variables of interest are indicator variables for the counties’ position in the IEI distribution. The omitted category is the indicator variable 
for counties with IEI scores less than the 25th percentile score, representing the most restrictive capital subsidy environments in the distribution. Controls include variables for 
county demographics, average earnings, and industrial structure as well as measures for state and local government tax rates, expenditures, and outstanding debt. Standard errors 








Table 12 Changes in Counties’ Establishment Shares Associated with Capital Subsidy Availability Quartiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Construction Manufacturing Transportation Wholesale trade Retail FIRE Services 
Panel A: Rural border counties 
25th–50th percentile −0.0729*** 0.0205*** 0.0103 −0.0611*** 0.0290** 0.0089 0.0256*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0072) (0.0103) (0.0182) (0.0125) (0.0066) (0.0060) 
50th–75th percentile −0.0245 0.0389*** −0.0024 −0.0544*** 0.0302*** 0.0124** 0.0273*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0062) (0.0097) (0.0145) (0.0106) (0.0060) (0.0056) 
IEI ≥ 75th percentile −0.0483** 0.0306*** 0.0176 −0.1352*** 0.0187 0.0187*** 0.0314*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0064) (0.0121) (0.0298) (0.0118) (0.0064) (0.0056) 
Panel B: Urban border counties 
25th–50th percentile −0.0400 0.0044 0.0010 −0.0512*** 0.0502*** −0.0082 0.0054 
 (0.0297) (0.0046) (0.0070) (0.0155) (0.0166) (0.0086) (0.0077) 
50th–75th percentile 0.0318 0.0083** 0.0010 −0.0772*** 0.0447*** −0.0019 0.0085 
 (0.0247) (0.0037) (0.0054) (0.0142) (0.0151) (0.0089) (0.0070) 
IEI ≥ 75th percentile 0.0365 0.0032 −0.0062 −0.0953*** 0.0454*** −0.0136* 0.0124* 
 (0.0264) (0.0039) (0.0058) (0.0164) (0.0140) (0.0073) (0.0070) 
Panel C: Multistate MSA counties 
25th–50th percentile 0.0157 0.0184** −0.0076 −0.0513* 0.0651*** −0.0351* −0.0300** 
 (0.0564) (0.0085) (0.0156) (0.0304) (0.0235) (0.0185) (0.0131) 
50th–75th percentile 0.0799 0.0198** −0.0079 −0.0610** 0.0576** −0.0023 −0.0051 
 (0.0504) (0.0084) (0.0144) (0.0293) (0.0234) (0.0168) (0.0118) 
IEI ≥ 75th percentile 0.1135** 0.0209** −0.0189 −0.0979*** 0.0477** −0.0426* −0.0167 
 (0.0547) (0.0083) (0.0150) (0.0316) (0.0241) (0.0217) (0.0129) 
NOTE: The table reports the results of 21 separate regressions. Panels correspond to the sample of counties. Column headings correspond to SIC major division. The unit of 
analysis is the two-digit SIC industry share of total county establishments in Panel A and share of total employment in Panel B. The variables of interest are indicator variables for 
the counties’ position in the IEI distribution. The omitted category is the indicator variable for counties with IEI scores less than the 25th percentile score, representing the most 
restrictive capital subsidy environments in the distribution. Control variables include measures for county demographics and average earnings as well as measures for state and 
local government tax rates, expenditures, and outstanding debt. Standard errors clustered at the county level are shown in parentheses. * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant 








from the lowest positions in the distribution to the range between the twenty-fifth and fiftieth 
percentiles (Panels A and B, respectively). Relative to the baseline capital subsidies package, 
providing the capital subsidies in the range between the fiftieth and seventy-fifth percentiles 
significantly increases both capital expenditure and capital expenditure per employee. Estimates 
for the highest percentiles suggest either diminishing returns or negative signals associated with 
the most generous capital subsidy packages. The pooled county employment density results 
suggest employment density is linearly decreasing in capital subsidies (Panel C, column 1); 
however, these results appear to be driven by urban counties. Rural county employment densities 
are decreasing in capital subsidies, but the effect diminishes as counties move higher in the 
distribution. 
Establishment-share changes associated IEI percentile indicators are reported in Table 12. 
Panel A confirms that manufacturing and service firms increase their share of establishments at 
the expense of construction and wholesale trade in rural counties. The results suggest some 
nonlinearity in the effect of increasing capital subsidies—either due to diminishing reductions in 
total costs or because potential revenue shortfalls associated with capital subsidies are negatively 
capitalized into land values. For example, Panel A, column 2 indicates that the biggest estimated 
increase in rural manufacturing shares occurs in counties in the range between the fiftieth and 
seventy-fifth percentiles of the distribution, rather than the seventy-fifth percentile (the null 
hypothesis of equality between the fiftieth-to-seventy-fifth percentile coefficient and the seventy-
fifth-percentile-or-higher coefficient can be statistically rejected at the five percent level).   
While all percentile categories of capital subsidies are associated with increased service 
establishment shares relative to the baseline, equality cannot be rejected. Wholesale trade 
establishment shares decrease more as counties move to the next highest percentile category. 
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Equality cannot be rejected for the twenty-fifth-to-fiftieth and the fiftieth-to-seventy-fifth 
percentile indicators, but can for the seventy-fifth. 
Table 12, Panels B and C, report the percentile category indicator results for urban border 
counties and multistate MSA counties, respectively. Panels B and C also suggest that 
manufacturing establishment shares increase at the expense of wholesale trade, with the biggest 
effects associated with the highest percentile category. Equality of effects, however, cannot be 
rejected at conventional levels. The categorical results also suggest positive spillovers for retail 
and construction in urban areas. Generally, the urban establishment share results also indicate a 
nonlinear relationship with capital subsidies.  
7  CONCLUSION 
Despite the lack of scholarly consensus on the effects of economic development 
incentives, they remain the primary economic development tool for many state and local 
governments. Nontax incentives make up a substantial portion of economic development 
incentive packages; however, they are also the type of incentive about which we know the least. 
Nontax incentives effectively subsidize capital as a job creation policy; however, the few studies 
examining nontax incentives suggest that these incentives do not support local job creation. The 
research herein investigates the mechanisms underlying these findings. Theory predicts that 
capital subsidies will have two effects. The first effect is capital-labor substitution, whereby 
firms adjust their input mix in favor of capital. Theory also predicts that subsidy-induced 
changes in total costs cause capital-intensive firms to outbid labor-intensive firms for land, 
resulting in changes in locations’ industry mix.  
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The results presented herein indicate increasing capital subsidy availability is associated 
with both capital-labor substitution and changes in local industry mix. Consistent with previous 
findings, urban and rural counties respond differently to an increase in the IEI. Capital subsidies 
appear most effective at inducing new capital expenditure in urban areas. Employment densities 
decline with increases in available capital subsidies, consistent with theoretical predictions about 
capital-labor substitution.   As predicted by theory, the industry employment share estimates also 
indicate that relatively capital-intensive industries increase their establishment shares at the 
expense of relatively labor-intensive industries with which they compete for land. The 
establishment-share results also suggest unmodeled spillovers between capital-intensive 
industries and labor-intensive industries, which vary between urban and rural areas. These 
findings suggest that further investigation of the interaction between capital subsidies and 
agglomeration externalities may be warranted. Taken together, the research presented herein 
suggests that subsidizing capital has consequences that may limit job creation effects. If capital-
labor substitution and crowding out of labor-intensive industries by capital-intensive industries 
dominates any spillovers, then employment levels either decrease or remain unchanged, even 
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Table A1  Summary Statistics for Manufacturing Capital Samples  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 






Mfg. capital expenditure 31,949 9,191 112,088 109,229 28,689 9,260 97,337 
 129,820 21,652 257,532 203,784 93,306 20,502 178,765 
Mfg. capital expend. per empl. 
 
3.744 3.224 5.309 4.742 3.558 3.045 5.114 
 5.018 4.416 6.245 4.393 4.182 3.409 5.664 
% population working age 0.372 0.364 0.401 0.405 0.372 0.366 0.399 
 0.045 0.042 0.045 0.0446 0.043 0.041 0.041 
% population minority 0.105 0.103 0.114 0.111 0.100 0.098 0.105 
 0.151 0.158 0.118 0.122 0.152 0.161 0.111 
Earnings per employee 14.010 13.310 16.710 17.31 14.140 13.400 17.030 
 6.506 5.984 7.651 8.158 6.538 5.985 7.709 
Manufacturing employment Share 0.204 0.203 0.206 0.209 0.207 0.202 0.226 
 0.137 0.143 0.112 0.113 0.140 0.145 0.118 
Farm employment share 0.203 0.239 0.061 0.0514 0.199 0.235 0.055 
 0.222 0.231 0.094 0.0935 0.223 0.232 0.095 
FIRE employment share 0.022 0.025 0.012 0.0786 0.020 0.022 0.010 
 0.026 0.028 0.013 0.0293 0.021 0.023 0.009 
Service employment share 0.069 0.066 0.081 0.279 0.067 0.065 0.074 
 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.0791 0.029 0.029 0.028 
Military employment share 0.261 0.256 0.279 0.0355 0.259 0.255 0.276 
 0.084 0.084 0.080 0.0876 0.085 0.086 0.082 
State effective corp. tax rate 0.024 0.023 0.029 0.0754 0.024 0.022 0.030 
 0.045 0.040 0.060 0.0110 0.044 0.033 0.071 
Indiv. income tax rate 0.076 0.076 0.077 0.0204 0.076 0.076 0.076 
(state and local) 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.00961 0.012 0.011 0.012 
Property tax rate 0.016 0.016 0.018 0.0305 0.017 0.017 0.018 
(state and local) 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.0136 0.010 0.010 0.011 
Sales tax rate 0.034 0.035 0.029 0.0206 0.034 0.035 0.028 
(state and local) 0.026 0.028 0.013 0.00742 0.024 0.026 0.013 
K–12 education expenditure 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.0836 0.023 0.023 0.022 
(state and local) 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.0174 0.009 0.009 0.008 
Public safety expenditure 0.098 0.101 0.085 0.0278 0.098 0.102 0.084 
(state and local) 0.025 0.026 0.020 0.00907 0.025 0.025 0.017 
Highway expenditure 0.026 0.025 0.028 0.0174 0.026 0.025 0.028 
(state and local) 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.00681 0.009 0.008 0.009 
Outstanding debt 0.023 0.025 0.017 0.156 0.024 0.026 0.017 
(state and local) 0.011 0.012 0.006 0.0912 0.011 0.012 0.007 
N 18426 14658 3768 1740 7962 6342 1620 
n 3071 2443 628 290 1327 1057 270 
T 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
NOTE: The table provides the mean (larger type size) and standard deviation (smaller type size) for the dependent and 
independent variables employed in the manufacturing capital regressions. Manufacturing capital expenditure is expressed in 
$000s. “(State and local)” means the expenditure/tax information from the line above uses both state and local expenditures. State 





Table A2  County Panel Establishment Average Industry Shares (%) 
 All counties Rural Urban Multistate MSA Border Rural border Urban border 
Construction  3.496 3.431 3.496 3.859 3.400 3.338 3.634 
 2.759 2.667 2.759 3.163 2.682 2.602 2.951 
FIRE   1.335 1.378 1.335 1.252 1.313 1.350 1.201 
 1.184 1.205 1.184 1.142 1.145 1.148 1.129 
Manufacturing  0.642 0.756 0.642 0.457 0.630 0.737 0.390 
 1.199 1.382 1.199 0.658 1.160 1.344 0.481 
Retail  4.152 4.273 4.152 3.823 4.166 4.264 3.796 
 2.805 2.894 2.805 2.536 2.753 2.823 2.434 
Service  2.257 2.257 2.257 2.271 2.266 2.263 2.276 
 1.972 1.953 1.972 2.022 1.973 1.951 2.048 
Transportation  1.106 1.271 1.106 0.815 1.110 1.267 0.669 
 1.504 1.643 1.504 1.043 1.519 1.667 0.848 
Wholesale Trade  3.248 3.352 3.248 2.932 3.266 3.388 2.801 
 2.230 2.337 2.230 1.734 2.434 2.591 1.627 
NOTE: The table provides summary statistics for the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry employment 
shares by SIC major division used as the dependent variable in the employment share regressions. Summary statistics for the 





Table A3  Effect of IEI on Border Counties' 2-Digit SIC Shares of Establishments by Major Division 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Construction Manufacturing Transportation Wholesale Retail FIRE Services 
IEI -0.0002 0.0005*** 0.0002* -0.0017*** 0.0002 0.0002** 0.0003*** 
 [-0.0035] [0.0268]*** [0.0075]* [-0.0347]*** [0.0032] [0.0073]** [0.0090]*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Observations 33,925 106,571 52,790 35,388 81,693 63,173 135,052 
R-squared 0.1684 0.0316 0.0405 0.0538 0.0698 0.1283 0.2573 
NOTE: The table reports the results of fourteen separate regressions using the sample of border of their state with another state. Column headings correspond to SIC major 
division. The unit of analysis is the 2-digit SIC industry share of total county establishments in Panel A and share of total employment in Panel B. Control include variables for 
county demographics, and average earnings well as measures for state and local government tax rates, expenditure, and outstanding debt. Beta coefficients are shown in brackets 
and robust standard errors shown in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
